University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Law & Economics Working Papers
11-19-2017

What a Difference Thirty Years Make: A Comparison of the Tax
Reforms of 1986, 2014 and 2017
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

University of Michigan Law School, aviyonah@umich.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current
Part of the Law and Economics Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Working Paper Citation
Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., "What a Difference Thirty Years Make: A Comparison of the Tax Reforms of 1986,
2014 and 2017" (2017). Law & Economics Working Papers. 144.
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/144

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law & Economics Working Papers by an authorized administrator
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Avi-Yonah:
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WHAT A DIFFERENCE THIRTY YEARS MAKE:
A COMPARISON OF THE TAX REFORMS OF 1986, 2014 and 2017

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
The University of Michigan

ABSTRACT
This paper compares the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, as passed by the House (TRA17H) and under
consideration by the Senate (TRA17S) with two major previous efforts at comprehensive tax reform: The
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) and the draft tax reform proposed by former Ways and Means Chair
David Camp (R-MI) (TRA14). It shows that TRA14 was quite similar to TRA86, but that TRA17 is very
different than both. Congress should abandon TRA17 and go back to considering TRA14 on a bipartisan
basis.

1. Introduction
TRA17, as passed by the House (TRA17H, H.R. 1, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, November 16, 2017)
and under consideration by the Senate (TRA17S, as passed by the Finance Committee,
November 16, 2017) represents a major departure from the two major legislative tax reform
efforts of the last thirty years –TRA86 and TRA14. Most importantly, TRA86 and TRA14 were
both revenue and distributionally neutral, while TRA17 adds at least $1.5 trillion to the deficit
and is heavily skewed towards the rich. The following compares the three tax reform efforts in
detail and concludes that TRA14 was a much superior product than TRA17.
2. Individual Tax Reform
TRA86 cut the individual tax rate on ordinary income from 50% to 28% and raised the capital
gains rate from 20% to 28%. This resulted in revenue losses on the individual side that were
made up by raising the effective corporate tax rate. The estate tax rate was 55%, and the AMT
was retained and expanded.
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TRA14 had a top rate on ordinary income of 35% (on an expanded tax base that eliminated most
tax expenditures such as employer provided health insurance and pension contributions). The
capital gains and dividends rate was 24.8% (including the 3.8% ACA tax on investment income).
The estate tax rate was 35% and the AMT was repealed, as was the carried interest provision.
TRA17H has a top individual rate on ordinary income of 39.6%, with a phase out of the lower
brackets resulting in a top rate of 45.6%. TRA17S has a top individual rate on ordinary income of
38.5%. The capital gains and dividends rate remains 23.8%, and carried interest is maintained in
both. The estate tax is repealed in TRA17H, while TRA17S doubles the exemption amount to $22
million. The AMT is repealed in both TRA17H and TRA17S.
Overall, TRA86 and TRA14 were distributionally neutral. TRA17 in both versions is heavily
skewed in favor of the rich. TRA86 and TRA14 achieved revenue and distributional neutrality by
expanding the base and limiting or eliminating deductions such as home mortgage interest and
state and local taxes. TRA17 limits some deductions, but much less than TRA86 and TRA14. The
disparate treatment of the estate tax and carried interest is typical. The estate tax, which only
falls on the rich, was retained in TRA86 and TRA14 and repealed or severely limited in TRA17.
The carried interest provision, which applies to super rich hedge fund managers, was eliminated
in TRA86 (because there was no preferential rate for capital gains) and TRA14 and is retained in
TRA17.
3. Corporate and Pass-Through Tax Reform
TRA86 cut the corporate tax rate from 46% to 34%, but significantly expanded the corporate
base (e.g., by repealing the General Utilities rule that exempted appreciated assets from
corporate tax), so that it raised revenue from the corporate sector to make up for revenue lost
on the individual side. It made no changes in pass-through taxation of partnerships and S
corporations other than providing that all publicly traded entities be taxed at the corporate
level.
TRA14 cut the corporate tax rate from 35% to 25%. It made no changes in the taxation of passthroughs, resulting in a ten percentage point differential between the top pass-through rate of
35% and the top corporate rate of 25% (but with an additional 24.8% on dividends and capital
gains).
TRA17 in both versions cuts the corporate rate from 35% to 20%. Because the rate differential
from the top individual rate is immense (as much as 25.6% in TRA17H), both TRA17H and
TRA17S have special rules for pass-through taxation. TRA17H subjects passive pass-through
income to a special rate of 25% while retaining the top individual rate of up to 45.6% on active
pass-through income from services. TRA17S has a 17.4% deduction for non-service income of
pass-throughs, resulting in an effective pass-through rate of 31.8%. Both TRA17H and TRA17S
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have complicated rules to try to distinguish pass-through income eligible for the lower rate from
wages.
Unlike TRA86 and TRA14, TRA17 in both versions adopts expensing (current deduction for
corporate acquisitions of machinery, etc.). Expensing results in a zero effective tax rate on the
normal return on capital. To prevent negative tax rates, TRA17 puts limits on net interest
deductions at 30% of EBITDA, but the remaining interest deduction plus expensing can still
create negative tax rates (i.e., tax shelters).
Overall, these provisions of TRA17 are significant revenue losers (loss of $683.4 billion in
TRA17S) and heavily skewed toward the rich, while TRA86 and TRA14 raised revenue from the
corporate sector. The pass-through provisions of both TRA17H and TRA17S are uniquely prone
to abuse, very complex, and reward rich individuals earning passive income through passthroughs. TRA86 and TRA14 did not include special pass-through rules because the tax
differential between the top individual and corporate rates was smaller (in TRA86 the top
corporate rate was 6 percentage points higher than the top individual rate, and in TRA14 it was
only 10 percentage points lower, in both cases without considering the extra layer of tax on
dividends and capital gains).
4. International Tax Reform
TRA86 significantly strengthened the international tax provisions by adding more categories to
Subpart F income and by imposing per category limits on the foreign tax credit. It retained
deferral on active income with a tax on dividend repatriations.
TRA14 adopted territoriality (an exemption for dividends from active income) but with strong
minimum tax provisions for foreign income not subject to foreign tax at 12.5% and limits on
interest deductions related to exempt dividends.
TRA17 in both versions adopts territoriality. Both versions include minimum tax provisions that
are significantly weaker than those of TRA14. In addition, both versions include inbound antibase erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) provisions, and these most likely violate both our tax
treaties and WTO rules while also being ineffective (because they only apply to transactions with
related parties, thus causing many direct sales and services provided to unrelated parties to fall
through the crack). TRA17S also has an export subsidy that is a blatant violation of WTO rules.
Neither version of TRA17 has any anti-inversion rules despite creating additional incentives to
invert to zero tax jurisdictions and thus avoid the minimum tax.
Overall, the international provisions of both TRA14 and TRA17 are weak. The lock-in problem
that they are supposed to solve is much better addressed by abolishing deferral, since at a 20%
rate with expensing US-based multinationals would have a competitive advantage over their
rivals without deferral.
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5. Conclusion: Back to the Drawing Board
In my opinion, both versions of TRA17 are fatally flawed because they (a) increase the deficit, (b)
are skewed toward the rich, and (c) increase complexity while drawing new lines the IRS will find
very hard to defend, like the line between wages and pass-through income. Congress should go
back to the drawing board on a bipartisan basis, and TRA14 is a good starting point for such an
effort.
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